Trump aide Monica Crowley plagiarized thousands of words in Ph.D. dissertation
By Andrew Kaczynski, Chris Massie, and Nathan McDermott, design by Tal Yellin
Conservative commentator Monica Crowley, who is slated to serve in a top national security communications role in Donald Trump's presidential administration, plagiarized thousands of words of her 2000 dissertation for her Columbia University Ph.D., a CNN KFile review has found.
On Monday, Politico reported that it found more than a dozen examples of plagiarism in Crowley's Ph.D. dissertation. CNN's KFile has found nearly 40 lengthy instances of Crowley lifting paragraphs from numerous sources, including several scholarly texts, the Associated Press, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
The revelation comes on the heels of another CNN KFile investigation, which found more than 50 instances of plagiarism in Crowley's 2012 book, "What The (Bleep) Just Happened." On Tuesday, the book's publisher, HarperCollins, announced that it would stop selling the book until "the author has the opportunity to source and revise the material."
Crowley's first plagiarism scandal came in 1999, the year before she submitted her dissertation. After The New York Times reported a reader found that a column she wrote in the Wall Street Journal strongly resembled a 1988 article in the neoconservative magazine Commentary, a Journal editor said that the paper would not have published her piece if it had known of the parallels. Crowley denied the charge but acknowledged that the language is similar.
Neither Crowley, nor the Trump transition team, responded to requests for comment.
Columbia also declined to comment in a statement, saying that all reviews of University research were kept confidential.
"We have no comment on Monica Crowley's dissertation, which was submitted in 2000 and is publicly available," the statement said. "The University's process for addressing concerns raised about University research preserves the confidentiality of any review, and even the fact of a review's existence is confidential while it is underway. Columbia is committed to upholding the very highest standards of integrity and credibility in academic research."
Trump has tapped Crowley, a syndicated radio host, columnist, author, and longtime Fox News contributor to be his senior director of strategic communications for the National Security Council.
The Trump transition team's statement announcing Crowley's selection hailed her reputation as a scholar.
It said, "Dr. Crowley, a renowned scholar who holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University, is a foreign affairs and political analyst for the Fox News Channel. She is also a New York Times bestselling author and a columnist and online opinion editor of The Washington Times."
In her dissertation on America's China policy under Truman and Nixon, entitled "Clearer Than Truth," Crowley, whose Ph.D. is in international relations, lifted multiple passages from Eric Larson's 1996 book, "Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations." She also repeatedly plagiarized James Chace's 1998 book, "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World," as well as a 1982 book by Yale's John Lewis Gaddis called "Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War." Crowley's dissertation also contains passages taken from a 1996 book by Thomas Christensen of Princeton, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958.
Crowley cited these and other sources in footnotes at various points in her dissertation, but often failed to include citations or to properly cite sources in sections where she copied their wording verbatim or closely paraphrased it.
Crowley's dissertation includes plagiarized paragraphs from commentary in a 1998 collection of transcripts of Henry Kissinger's declassified conversations with other diplomats and world leaders. She also lifted material from Henry Kissinger's 1979 memoirs, using Kissinger's language to summarize Kissinger's descriptions of the Nixon administration's thought processes without quoting him.
Crowley's dissertation contains parts of a January 1999 Associated Press article copied word-for-word.
Other sources she plagiarized include an August 1977 issue of the Libertarian Review, a 1982 report by Brookings fellow Raymond L. Garthoff, a 1971 academic article by John E. Mueller, and a 1971 article in the magazine Foreign Affairs.
Crowley, page 168
Mueller found a "rally in support at the
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be a
“long, bloody affair.”The figure below shows the
course of public support for the war. American
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support for
and opposition to
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression; support
for the war was
down to hard-core supporters co
and fell only
an additional ten
points thereafter. The principal reasons for
continued support for the war were, not
surprisingly, the reasons established for American
grand strategy by Truman two decades before:
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.
The Roper Center's February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam wasthe
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.60
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson (and later,
the Nixon)administration
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed tothe polarization of
opinion. For example, while 29 percent of those
Gallup polled in November 1965 thought the war
would end in a victory for the United States, 30
percent expected a stalemate or compromise, and 10
percent expected a very lengthy conflict. By May
1966, 54 percent expected the war to result in a
compromise, and by February 1968, 61 percent
expected such an outcome.
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may have also
diminished
over the course of the war.
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be a
“long, bloody affair.”The figure below shows the
course of public support for the war. American
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support for
and opposition to
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression; support
for the war was
down to hard-core supporters co
and fell only
an additional ten
points thereafter. The principal reasons for
continued support for the war were, not
surprisingly, the reasons established for American
grand strategy by Truman two decades before:
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.
The Roper Center's February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam wasthe
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.60
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson (and later,
the Nixon)administration
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed tothe polarization of
opinion. For example, while 29 percent of those
Gallup polled in November 1965 thought the war
would end in a victory for the United States, 30
percent expected a stalemate or compromise, and 10
percent expected a very lengthy conflict. By May
1966, 54 percent expected the war to result in a
compromise, and by February 1968, 61 percent
expected such an outcome.
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may have also
diminished
over the course of the war.
Mueller found a “rally” in support at the
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be
“a long, bloody affair.”51 In the event, U.S.
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support
and opposition for
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression—support
for the war wasgenerally
down to hard-core supporters
and fell only perhaps
an additional 10
points thereafter. The principal reasons that
lay behind
continued support for the war were
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.53
The Roper Center’s February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson and Nixon
administrations
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed topolarization.55
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may also have
diminished for many leaders and members of the
public
over the course of the war.56 For others,
however, the stakes may have increased.
beginning of the war and high levels of public
support into 1966. By mid-1966, however, support
had declined in the wake of such events as
infighting among the South Vietnamese and the
emergence of vocal criticism of the war during the
Fulbright hearings in early 1966. By this time,
the public had also come to see that the war would
not be over quickly but was instead likely to be
“a long, bloody affair.”51 In the event, U.S.
forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased to
over half a million. By the time of the 1968 Tet
offensive, support
and opposition for
the war had hardened to a point at which events
on the battlefield or in Washington were less
likely to make an impression—support
for the war wasgenerally
down to hard-core supporters
and fell only perhaps
an additional 10
points thereafter. The principal reasons that
lay behind
continued support for the war were
the containment of communism, U.S. credibility,
and strengthening the resolve of others to resist
communism.53
The Roper Center’s February 1968 poll found that
49 percent thought one of the strongest reasons
for the U.S. military effort in Vietnam was
containment of communism; 33 percent cited the
impact on the will of others to resist communism;
and 23 percent cited the potential loss of
prestige and confidence of U.S. friends and
allies.
Compared to the benefits of a military victory,
the political objective the Johnson and Nixon
administrations
pursued—achieving a negotiated
settlement—probably limited the expected gains
from the war for most members of the public and
may have contributed topolarization.55
In addition to the U.S. stakes being somewhat
unclear for many, the value of the strategic
stakes or consequences of a loss may also have
diminished for many leaders and members of the
public
over the course of the war.56 For others,
however, the stakes may have increased.
Crowley, page 69
Larson, 1996
Public support is afluid dynamic: given
information and analysis by leaders and elites,
the public constantly weighs
the benefits and prospects of
success against the likely and actual costs and
then reaches
a determination as to
whether the likely
outcome is worth thesacrifice.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated.Traditionally,
U.S. military operationshave been
explained and justified both in normative terms
(stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
at stake) and pragmatic terms (stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
involvement.) Further,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that areinvolved
establishes a connection between the objectives
of the
operation and the larger purpose behind it.
information and analysis by leaders and elites,
the public constantly weighs
the benefits and prospects of
success against the likely and actual costs and
then reaches
a determination as to
whether the likely
outcome is worth thesacrifice.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated.Traditionally,
U.S. military operationshave been
explained and justified both in normative terms
(stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
at stake) and pragmatic terms (stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
involvement.) Further,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that areinvolved
establishes a connection between the objectives
of the
operation and the larger purpose behind it.
In short, support can be thought of as a
constant rebalancing of
the benefits and prospects for
success against the likely and actual costs—and
a determination of
whether the
outcome is judged worth the costs—all informed
by leaders and experts.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated. First, as a practical matter,
U.S. military operationsare typically
explained and justified both in normative
terms—stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
that are at stake—andpragmatic
terms—stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
intervention. Second,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that areengaged
establishes a connection between the objectives
of a given
operation and the larger purposes it is
promoting.
constant rebalancing of
the benefits and prospects for
success against the likely and actual costs—and
a determination of
whether the
outcome is judged worth the costs—all informed
by leaders and experts.
As new events occur or objective conditions
change, they are interpreted by political leaders
and experts, and the ends and means are
reevaluated. First, as a practical matter,
U.S. military operationsare typically
explained and justified both in normative
terms—stressing
the importance of the principles and interests
that are at stake—andpragmatic
terms—stressing
the good prospects and reasonable costs of the
intervention. Second,
a focus on the particular objectives of the
operation and the perceptions of the principles
and interests that areengaged
establishes a connection between the objectives
of a given
operation and the larger purposes it is
promoting.
Crowley, page 170
Larson, 1996
As the Sino-Soviet split
became more apparent,
the costs of Vietnam
rose, leading to a
waning of public support,
an intensification of the
public’s suspicion, and
the emergence of
increasingly skeptical
criticism of the
strategic importance of
Southeast Asia.
In fact, concern about
the impact on U.S.
credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal
seemed to be
the dominant concern for
realists. As early as
1966,
George Kennan and Hans
Morgenthau argued
that defending Vietnam
to contain communism was
a misapplication of the
containment doctrine,
even though it was a
logical consequence of
the Truman
Doctrine. Kennan was,
however, concerned about
the ramifications for
U.S. credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal.
Seyom Brown suggests
that,
as the Sino-Soviet split
became more apparent and
a multipolar world began
to emerge and as
the costs of Vietnam
rose,
increasingly skeptical
criticism of the
strategic importance of
Indochina emerged.
In fact, concern about
the impact on U.S.
credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal
seemed to become
the dominant concern for
realists. As early as
1966, such realists as
George Kennan and Hans
Morgenthau were arguing
that defending Vietnam
to contain communism was
a misapplication of the
containment
doctrine. Kennan was,
however, concerned about
the ramifications for
U.S. credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal.
that,
as the Sino-Soviet split
became more apparent and
a multipolar world began
to emerge and as
the costs of Vietnam
rose,
increasingly skeptical
criticism of the
strategic importance of
Indochina emerged.
In fact, concern about
the impact on U.S.
credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal
seemed to become
the dominant concern for
realists. As early as
1966, such realists as
George Kennan and Hans
Morgenthau were arguing
that defending Vietnam
to contain communism was
a misapplication of the
containment
doctrine. Kennan was,
however, concerned about
the ramifications for
U.S. credibility of a
precipitous withdrawal.
Crowley, page 172
Larson, 1996
And according to Paul
M. Kattenburg, the
domestic consensus based
upon containment of the
Soviet Union and
communism had been
fundamentally shaken by
1969.
M. Kattenburg, the
domestic consensus based
upon containment of the
Soviet Union and
communism had been
fundamentally shaken by
1969.
According to Paul M.
Kattenburg, the domestic
consensus based upon
containment of the Soviet
Union and communism had
been fundamentally shaken
by 1969.
Kattenburg, the domestic
consensus based upon
containment of the Soviet
Union and communism had
been fundamentally shaken
by 1969.
Crowley, page 267
Larson, 1996
The Fulbright hearingsof early 1966 had been
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing it, thereby
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring additional
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
showing little sign
of progress, and the Democrats were getting the
blame.
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing it, thereby
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring additional
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
showing little sign
of progress, and the Democrats were getting the
blame.
The Fulbright hearingsin early 1966 had been
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing the war, thus
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring further
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
yielding little evidence
of progress.
highly critical of the war and had featured
establishment stalwarts criticizing the war, thus
making dissent respectable. Growing congressional
and elite criticism of the war called into
question both the importance of U.S. interests in
Vietnam and the wisdom of incurring further
costs in an intervention that seemed to be
yielding little evidence
of progress.
Crowley, page 278
Larson, 1996
Three years before Nixon took office, fewer than
four in ten Americans believed that the
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given thisalready
limited willingness to accept Korea-level
casualties, it was
remarkable that
Johnson and Nixon
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea.
By the time of the Tetoffensive in early
1968,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
four in ten Americans believed that the
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given thisalready
limited willingness to accept Korea-level
casualties, it was
remarkable that
Johnson and Nixon
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea.
By the time of the Tetoffensive in early
1968,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
Early in the war, fewer than four in ten
expressed a belief thata
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given this
limited willingness to accept Korea-like
casualties in a war in Vietnam, it is
remarkable that the
Johnson and Nixonadministrations
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea. In the event,
by the time of Tet,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
expressed a belief thata
war in Vietnam was worth Korea-like or higher
costs. Given this
limited willingness to accept Korea-like
casualties in a war in Vietnam, it is
remarkable that the
Johnson and Nixonadministrations
were able to continue prosecuting the war so long
after Vietnam’s casualty rates had reached those
of Korea. In the event,
by the time of Tet,
the rate at which casualties were being incurred
had mounted to the Korea-like rates that fewer
than four in ten had earlier indicated a
willingness to accept—an overall casualty rate in
the thousands, with several hundred dying each
week.
Crowley, page 281
Larson, 1996
Even with that
flexibility, however, it
was clear that
the increasing costs
came to be judged by
majorities as being
incommensurate with the
expected and actual
benefits of the war and
its prospects for
success.
flexibility, however, it
was clear that
the increasing costs
came to be judged by
majorities as being
incommensurate with the
expected and actual
benefits of the war and
its prospects for
success.
In Vietnam,
the increasing costs
came to be judged by
majorities as being
incommensurate with the
expected
benefits of the war and
its prospects for
success.
the increasing costs
came to be judged by
majorities as being
incommensurate with the
expected
benefits of the war and
its prospects for
success.
Crowley, page 352
Larson, 1996
By mid-1969, there was a general acceptance
by the Nixon administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization. Thus
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and members of the
administration
could move to supportit.
At the same time,however,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
by the Nixon administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization. Thus
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and members of the
administration
could move to supportit.
At the same time,however,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
As Mueller (1973, p.101) summarized the process
after 1968: [With] the ultimate acceptance in
mid-1969
by the Nixon Administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization . . .
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and
administration followers
could move to itssupport.
At the same time, of course,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
after 1968: [With] the ultimate acceptance in
mid-1969
by the Nixon Administration of a policy of
gradual withdrawal while it also continued and
formalized the policy of Vietnamization . . .
withdrawal of a sort became official presidential
policy and
administration followers
could move to itssupport.
At the same time, of course,
leaders of the Democratic opposition became
increasingly withdrawal conscious, and people
inclined to follow their lead had a model.
Crowley, page 101
James Chace, "Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World,” 1998
By modifying the China
aid bill to allow the
unexpended portion to be
used to continue to aid
the KMT, Congress had
made
it impossible for
Acheson to abandon
support for the
Nationalists and move to
a realist policy of
establishing relations
with the communists
based on their effective
control of the
government of China.
Congress’ action was, of
course, a reaction to
the success of the
anti-communist rhetorical
campaign being waged by
the administration, but
it was met by the
unintended consequence of Mao declaring
on June 30, 1949, that
China would align itself
with the Soviet Union. To
assure the Soviets that
he was not
an Asian Tito, he
stated,
“We must lean to one
side...Sitting
on the fence will not
do; nor is there a third
road.”23 Mao’s
announcement
may have been influenced
by the extension of the
aid bill, but for months
before his statement,
the Chinese communist
leadership had been
giving mixed signals; as
Chou Enlai had stated:
“It is a fond dream of
the United States to
split China from the
Soviet Union,” but he
also argued that
“the Chinese Communist
Party cannot afford to
make enemies on both
sides; no force can
prevent it from having
two friends at once.”
aid bill to allow the
unexpended portion to be
used to continue to aid
the KMT, Congress had
made
it impossible for
Acheson to abandon
support for the
Nationalists and move to
a realist policy of
establishing relations
with the communists
based on their effective
control of the
government of China.
Congress’ action was, of
course, a reaction to
the success of the
anti-communist rhetorical
campaign being waged by
the administration, but
it was met by the
unintended consequence of Mao declaring
on June 30, 1949, that
China would align itself
with the Soviet Union. To
assure the Soviets that
he was not
an Asian Tito, he
stated,
“We must lean to one
side...Sitting
on the fence will not
do; nor is there a third
road.”23 Mao’s
announcement
may have been influenced
by the extension of the
aid bill, but for months
before his statement,
the Chinese communist
leadership had been
giving mixed signals; as
Chou Enlai had stated:
“It is a fond dream of
the United States to
split China from the
Soviet Union,” but he
also argued that
“the Chinese Communist
Party cannot afford to
make enemies on both
sides; no force can
prevent it from having
two friends at once.”
In effect, Congress
was making
it impossible for
Acheson to abandon
support of the Chinese
Nationalists and move to
a realist policy of
establishing relations
with Beijing on the
basis of who
represented the
effective
government of China. No
sooner had the aid bill
been modified than Mao
Zedong declared
on June 30, 1949, that
China would align itself
with the Soviet Union. To
assure the Soviets that
he was not about to
become
an Asian Tito, he
asserted,
“We must lean to one
side…. Sitting
on the fence will not
do; nor is there a third
road.” 25 Mao’s
decision
may have been influenced
by the extension of the
aid bill, but the way
had been foreshadowed by
Zhou Enlai a few months
earlier when he said:
“It is a fond dream of
the United States to
split China from the
Soviet Union.” However,
“The Chinese Communist
Party cannot afford to
make enemies on both
sides; no force can
prevent it from having
two friends at once.”
was making
it impossible for
Acheson to abandon
support of the Chinese
Nationalists and move to
a realist policy of
establishing relations
with Beijing on the
basis of who
represented the
effective
government of China. No
sooner had the aid bill
been modified than Mao
Zedong declared
on June 30, 1949, that
China would align itself
with the Soviet Union. To
assure the Soviets that
he was not about to
become
an Asian Tito, he
asserted,
“We must lean to one
side…. Sitting
on the fence will not
do; nor is there a third
road.” 25 Mao’s
decision
may have been influenced
by the extension of the
aid bill, but the way
had been foreshadowed by
Zhou Enlai a few months
earlier when he said:
“It is a fond dream of
the United States to
split China from the
Soviet Union.” However,
“The Chinese Communist
Party cannot afford to
make enemies on both
sides; no force can
prevent it from having
two friends at once.”
Crowley, page 102
Chace, 1998
Ten days after Mao’sspeech, he
dispatched Chen Mingshu
to explain his thinking to
Ambassador Stuart.
In mid-July 1949, Chen told
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was gearedfor
domestic consumption and that the CCP
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese communist
regime. Trade was thekey issue. The
administration
saw Sino-American trade as a way to pry
the Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Chou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin.(Simultaneously,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the NATO
treaty,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the rapidly developing cold war.)
dispatched Chen Mingshu
to explain his thinking to
Ambassador Stuart.
In mid-July 1949, Chen told
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was gearedfor
domestic consumption and that the CCP
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese communist
regime. Trade was thekey issue. The
administration
saw Sino-American trade as a way to pry
the Chinese communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Chou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin.(Simultaneously,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the NATO
treaty,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the rapidly developing cold war.)
In fact, ten days after Mao’s “lean to one
side” statement, Mao
dispatched Chen Mingshu,described as a “fellow
traveler of the Communists” from the Nationalists,
to explain his thinking to the American
ambassador in Nanjing.
In mid-July 1949 Chen told Ambassador
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was designed“for his own Party.” TheChinese Communists
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese Communist
regime. 27 If Mao and Zhou were moving closer to
Stalin, they nonetheless hoped to have good
relations with theUnited States, which could
eventually lead to recognition. In this respect,
their policies briefly converged with what Truman
and Acheson were trying to do. The Americans
saw Sino-American trade as a means of weaning
away
the Chinese Communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Zhou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin. At the same time,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the Cold War.
side” statement, Mao
dispatched Chen Mingshu,described as a “fellow
traveler of the Communists” from the Nationalists,
to explain his thinking to the American
ambassador in Nanjing.
In mid-July 1949 Chen told Ambassador
Stuart that Mao’s declaration was designed“for his own Party.” TheChinese Communists
still hoped for formal diplomatic relations
between the United States and a Chinese Communist
regime. 27 If Mao and Zhou were moving closer to
Stalin, they nonetheless hoped to have good
relations with theUnited States, which could
eventually lead to recognition. In this respect,
their policies briefly converged with what Truman
and Acheson were trying to do. The Americans
saw Sino-American trade as a means of weaning
away
the Chinese Communists from Moscow’s embrace; Mao
and Zhou
saw it as a hedge against too close an alignment
with Stalin. At the same time,
Stalin, alarmed at the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949,
perceived China as an increasingly valuable asset
in the Cold War.
Crowley, page 105
Chace, 1998
In the Letter,
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of aid.” Emphasizing
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.”
The Letter was essentially a political document
meant to portray
the Chinese communists as chumps
of Moscow; it stated that the CCP
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia,”though,
according to John Melby,who drafted
the White Paper, Acheson did not agree with
this assessment but approved the language
to appease the China bloc.38 But
by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue his
preferred policy ofeventual
recognition, even if Maowere to
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. Even at this point,
Acheson was still searching for a way tokeep
apart Moscow and Beijing. He apparently
believed that the CCP
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of its
own people and those ofthe Soviet Union.
By accusing Mao ofsubmitting
to Stalin, he hoped toinspire
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.”39
The White Paper aroused widespread fury.
Journalist
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union,
believed that the United States was
doing too much on behalf of a hopeless cause.
The China bloc was outraged because they
believed the United States was doing
too little. GeneralPatrick
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
Republican Senators such as
Knowland, Styles Bridges,
and Kenneth Wherry,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran
assailed the White Paper as “a 1054 page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of aid.” Emphasizing
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.”
The Letter was essentially a political document
meant to portray
the Chinese communists as chumps
of Moscow; it stated that the CCP
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia,”though,
according to John Melby,who drafted
the White Paper, Acheson did not agree with
this assessment but approved the language
to appease the China bloc.38 But
by asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue his
preferred policy ofeventual
recognition, even if Maowere to
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. Even at this point,
Acheson was still searching for a way tokeep
apart Moscow and Beijing. He apparently
believed that the CCP
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of its
own people and those ofthe Soviet Union.
By accusing Mao ofsubmitting
to Stalin, he hoped toinspire
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.”39
The White Paper aroused widespread fury.
Journalist
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union,
believed that the United States was
doing too much on behalf of a hopeless cause.
The China bloc was outraged because they
believed the United States was doing
too little. GeneralPatrick
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
Republican Senators such as
Knowland, Styles Bridges,
and Kenneth Wherry,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran
assailed the White Paper as “a 1054 page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
In the Letter, signed by the secretary of state,
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of American aid.”
Pointing out
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.” 29
The Letter was essentially a political document
that portrayed
the Chinese Communists as tools
of Moscow. It stated that the Chinese Communist
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia.”30 This
was a position that Acheson did not hold,
according to John Melby,a key adviser on China
affairs for General Marshall, who had written
the draft of
the White Paper. 31 Heapproved this language
in order
to appease the China bloc and because he thought
it would be little noted. Once again, as he had in
1947 when he used the heightened rhetoric of the
“rotten apples” to gain support for aid to Greece
and Turkey, in the Letter Acheson dangerously
overstated his case.
By asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue a
policy of
recognition, even shouldMao eventually
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. In fact,
Acheson was still searching for a way to
separate Beijing fromMoscow. He seems to have
believed that China’s Communist leaders
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of their
own people and those ofMoscow.
By accusing Mao ofkowtowing
to Stalin, he hoped tospur on
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.” 32
Not only did
the White Paper arouse the ire of
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union and also believed America had been
doing too much in alosing cause, it also
enraged
the China bloc, whichbelieved America had
done
too little. General
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-Communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
33
Republican senators like
Knowland, Styles Bridgesof New Hampshire,
and Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada,
assailed the White Paper as “a 1,054-page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
Acheson was determined to demonstrate that the
failures of the Nationalist government “do not
stem from an inadequacy of American aid.”
Pointing out
that “history has proved again and again that a
regime without faith in itself and an army without
morale cannot survive the test of battle,” the
Letter reiterated that “nothing the United States
did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed the
results.” 29
The Letter was essentially a political document
that portrayed
the Chinese Communists as tools
of Moscow. It stated that the Chinese Communist
leaders “have publicly announced their
subservience to a foreign power, Russia.”30 This
was a position that Acheson did not hold,
according to John Melby,a key adviser on China
affairs for General Marshall, who had written
the draft of
the White Paper. 31 Heapproved this language
in order
to appease the China bloc and because he thought
it would be little noted. Once again, as he had in
1947 when he used the heightened rhetoric of the
“rotten apples” to gain support for aid to Greece
and Turkey, in the Letter Acheson dangerously
overstated his case.
By asserting Beijing’s submissiveness to Moscow,
he made it much more difficult to pursue a
policy of
recognition, even shouldMao eventually
conquer Taiwan and eliminate all domestic
opposition. In fact,
Acheson was still searching for a way to
separate Beijing fromMoscow. He seems to have
believed that China’s Communist leaders
would eventually have to choose between the
interests of their
own people and those ofMoscow.
By accusing Mao ofkowtowing
to Stalin, he hoped tospur on
the Chinese to “throw off the foreign yoke.” 32
Not only did
the White Paper arouse the ire of
Walter Lippmann, who attacked the language about
China’s subservience to the Soviet Union and also believed America had been
doing too much in alosing cause, it also
enraged
the China bloc, whichbelieved America had
done
too little. General
Hurley called the White Paper “a smooth alibi for
the pro-Communists in the State Department who had
engineered the overthrow of our ally, the
Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.”
33
Republican senators like
Knowland, Styles Bridgesof New Hampshire,
and Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska,
along with Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada,
assailed the White Paper as “a 1,054-page
whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which
has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of
Soviet conquest.”
Crowley, page 108
Chace, 1998
Walton Butterworth, the assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, argued for a UN
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence,and
George Kennan argued
for ridding the island of the Nationalists
but retaining it as a strategic asset
to the United States,Acheson
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
communists.46 But facedwith domestic pressure
to support Taiwan from any threat by the
Chinese
communists, Acheson hadto back down, at
least in theory.
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of
$75 million for “the general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon
discovered that the president,
on Acheson’s counsel,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president,
he
declared that the United States
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao's government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.
State for Far Eastern Affairs, argued for a UN
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence,and
George Kennan argued
for ridding the island of the Nationalists
but retaining it as a strategic asset
to the United States,Acheson
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
communists.46 But facedwith domestic pressure
to support Taiwan from any threat by the
Chinese
communists, Acheson hadto back down, at
least in theory.
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of
$75 million for “the general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful, but they soon
discovered that the president,
on Acheson’s counsel,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president,
he
declared that the United States
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao's government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.
In the State DepartmentWalton Butterworth, the
assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, and George Kennan offered different
approaches, designed to prevent the island from
coming under Mao’s control. Butterworth suggested
a United Nations
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence.
George Kennan proposed a drastic scheme
for ridding the island of the Nationalist
soldiers
but retaining it asstrategically valuable
to the United States. He urged the use of
American forces to throw Chiang’s troops out of
Taiwan and the adjoining islands and, under
American auspices and protection, create an
independent country. This was the way “Theodore
Roosevelt might have done it,” he suggested, with
“resolution, speed, ruthlessness and
self-assurance.” 35Acheson rejected these
proposals and
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
Communists. 36 In August 1949, in a meeting with
members of the National Security Council, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed that military
measures would be unwise. 37 Still, pressures
mounted on Acheson
to support Taiwan from any attack from the
mainland
Communists. As Achesonwrote to his old
friend Archibald MacLeish in early 1950,
“Formosa is a subject which seems to draw out the
boys like a red haired girl on the beach. It
appears that what you want most is what you ain’t
got.” 38
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of $
75 million for the “general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon
discovered that Truman,
on Acheson’s advice,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In a December 23
meeting between the State Department and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Acheson argued that “Mao is not a
true satellite in that he came to power by his own
efforts and was not installed in office by the
Soviet army.” In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president
he further
declared that America
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao’s government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.”
assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs, and George Kennan offered different
approaches, designed to prevent the island from
coming under Mao’s control. Butterworth suggested
a United Nations
plebiscite that would allow Taiwan’s population
to vote for either mainland control or some form
of UN trusteeship, pending independence.
George Kennan proposed a drastic scheme
for ridding the island of the Nationalist
soldiers
but retaining it asstrategically valuable
to the United States. He urged the use of
American forces to throw Chiang’s troops out of
Taiwan and the adjoining islands and, under
American auspices and protection, create an
independent country. This was the way “Theodore
Roosevelt might have done it,” he suggested, with
“resolution, speed, ruthlessness and
self-assurance.” 35Acheson rejected these
proposals and
recommended that the United States abandon any
effort to prevent the island from falling to the
Communists. 36 In August 1949, in a meeting with
members of the National Security Council, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed that military
measures would be unwise. 37 Still, pressures
mounted on Acheson
to support Taiwan from any attack from the
mainland
Communists. As Achesonwrote to his old
friend Archibald MacLeish in early 1950,
“Formosa is a subject which seems to draw out the
boys like a red haired girl on the beach. It
appears that what you want most is what you ain’t
got.” 38
When Truman signed a Mutual Defense Act that
included an appropriation of $
75 million for the “general area of China,”
Chiang’s supporters grew hopeful. But they soon
discovered that Truman,
on Acheson’s advice,
did not intend to use the money to aid the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan. In a December 23
meeting between the State Department and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Acheson argued that “Mao is not a
true satellite in that he came to power by his own
efforts and was not installed in office by the
Soviet army.” In
his end-of-the-year memorandum to the president
he further
declared that America
should not subsidize attacks by the Nationalists
on Mao’s government, which “would soon be widely
recognized.”
Crowley, page 114
Chace, 1998
On January 10, Acheson testified in executive
session before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He stated that
he saw no reason to movewith dispatch on the
matter of recognizing Mao’s government, saying
that
he wanted to see how the CCP
would behave toward Americans in China andhow
it would handle
the foreign debtsincurred by
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”
Two days later, hedelivered his famous speech
at
the National Press Club,during which he
reminded his audience that no one
said “the Nationalist government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist;” on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country had
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.” He
went on to
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defense
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippines.
Foreshadowing Nixon’s later policy of
Vietnamization, he stated that
in South Korea,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations...” He did emphasize,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea and Japan.
session before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He stated that
he saw no reason to movewith dispatch on the
matter of recognizing Mao’s government, saying
that
he wanted to see how the CCP
would behave toward Americans in China andhow
it would handle
the foreign debtsincurred by
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”
Two days later, hedelivered his famous speech
at
the National Press Club,during which he
reminded his audience that no one
said “the Nationalist government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist;” on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country had
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.” He
went on to
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defense
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippines.
Foreshadowing Nixon’s later policy of
Vietnamization, he stated that
in South Korea,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations...” He did emphasize,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea and Japan.
On January 10, 1950,Acheson testified in
executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. As far as recognition of
Mao’s government was concerned,
he saw no reason to movetoo swiftly at this
time.
He wanted to see how the Chinese Communists
would behave toward Americans in China, and
their attitude toward
the foreign debts of
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”44
Two days later Achesondelivered an important
address on Far Eastern policy to
the National Press Clubin Washington. Tossing
aside the speech the department had prepared,
which he felt lacked life and had “no continuity
of thought,” he had made extensive notes for a new
speech at his house in Georgetown. Acheson’s press
club speech had little to do with military
matters, and indeed he had urged his listeners not
“to become obsessed with military considerations.”
In the main, Acheson was repeating for a larger
public what he had been saying privately to
members of Congress. He
reminded his audience that nobody
said “the Nationalist Government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist”; on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country has
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”45
Acheson did, however,
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defensive
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippine
Islands.
In South Korea, on the other hand,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations….”Acheson emphasized,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea, as it did forJapan.
executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. As far as recognition of
Mao’s government was concerned,
he saw no reason to movetoo swiftly at this
time.
He wanted to see how the Chinese Communists
would behave toward Americans in China, and
their attitude toward
the foreign debts of
the Nationalist government, but he warned the
senators not to get “this thing mixed up with
approval or disapproval.” Above all, “We should
not [use] military forces of the United States to
take, secure, or defend Formosa.”44
Two days later Achesondelivered an important
address on Far Eastern policy to
the National Press Clubin Washington. Tossing
aside the speech the department had prepared,
which he felt lacked life and had “no continuity
of thought,” he had made extensive notes for a new
speech at his house in Georgetown. Acheson’s press
club speech had little to do with military
matters, and indeed he had urged his listeners not
“to become obsessed with military considerations.”
In the main, Acheson was repeating for a larger
public what he had been saying privately to
members of Congress. He
reminded his audience that nobody
said “the Nationalist Government fell because it
was confronted by overwhelming military force
which it could not resist”; on the contrary,
Chiang’s “support in the country has
melted away.” He warned Americans against “the
folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part,”
which could “deflect from the Russians to
ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and
the hatred of the Chinese which must develop. It
would be folly to deflect it to ourselves.”45
Acheson did, however,
describe the military security of the Pacific
area, pointing out that the American “defensive
perimeter” ran from the Aleutian Islands to
Japan, then on to Okinawa and the Philippine
Islands.
In South Korea, on the other hand,
“initial reliance must be on the people attacked
to resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations….”Acheson emphasized,
however, that the United States bore “a direct
responsibility” for Korea, as it did forJapan.
Crowley, page 116
Chace, 1998
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later, Moscow and Beijing signed
a defense pact,
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later, Moscow and Beijing signed
a defense pact,
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact.
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact.
Crowley, page 114
Chace, 1998
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified
in executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. He reiterated his argument
for nonintervention and dismissed Taiwan as “not a
great question in American foreign policy,” but he
added that “it may become a very great question if
it obscures or changes or interferes with what we
are trying to do in regard to China.” And again,
he stated the belief that a split with Moscow was
possible:
“If the devil himself runs China,
if he is an independent devil, that is infinitely
better than if he is a stooge of Moscow.”
Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in
February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe,
will come into conflict with Moscow.”69 Further, Acheson
told the senators that he was particularly wary
of Chiang’s
adventurism: the riskwas
that Chiang, who was running a war against the
mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,”
would drag the United States into war with
mainland China.
According to Acheson, Chiang “believed that
World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which
case “the United States will have to go back and
conquer China, and he will come riding in on our
coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was tempting
Mao to invade Taiwan: “The •communists would be
criminally crazy
if they did not put an end to (Chiang’s hold ora
the island)
just as soon as possible.” Had thisactually
happened, Acheson believed that he could have
overcome domestic
opposition to recognizing thecommunist
regime.
On January 14, 1950, Mao’s government seized
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact. Yet despite this rapprochement between
Russia and China, Acheson did not give up on the
hope of abandoning Chiang, recognizing the
People’s Republic of China, and then weaning it
away from a Soviet alliance.51
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified
in executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
“If the devil himself runs China,” he said,
“if he is an independent devil, that is
infinitely better than if he is a stooge of
Moscow, or China comes under Russia.”
Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in
February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe,
will come into conflict with Moscow.”52 Acheson also
told the senators that he was especially wary
of Chiang Kai-shek’s
adventurism, the risk
that Chiang, who was running a war against the
mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,”
would drag the United States into conflictwith
China proper.
According to Acheson, Chiang “believed
World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which
case “the United States will have to go back and
conquer China, and he will come riding in on our
coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was actually inviting
Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be
criminally crazy,” he advised the senators,
“if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s island
bastion]
just as soon as possible.”53 Had this
happened, Acheson believed that he could have
overcome
opposition to recognizing CommunistChina.
American consular property in Shanghai and
Beijing, which led to the withdrawal of all
American personnel from the Chinese mainland that
spring. A month later Moscow and Beijing signed
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, a defense
pact. Yet despite this rapprochement between
Russia and China, Acheson did not give up on the
hope of abandoning Chiang, recognizing the
People’s Republic of China, and then weaning it
away from a Soviet alliance.51
On March 29, 1950, Acheson once again testified
in executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
“If the devil himself runs China,” he said,
“if he is an independent devil, that is
infinitely better than if he is a stooge of
Moscow, or China comes under Russia.”
Despite the Sino-Soviet agreement signed in
February, “the Chinese, inevitably, we believe,
will come into conflict with Moscow.”52 Acheson also
told the senators that he was especially wary
of Chiang Kai-shek’s
adventurism, the risk
that Chiang, who was running a war against the
mainland by “bombing Nanking and other cities,”
would drag the United States into conflictwith
China proper.
According to Acheson, Chiang “believed
World War III is absolutely inevitable,” in which
case “the United States will have to go back and
conquer China, and he will come riding in on our
coat tails.” As far as Acheson was concerned,
Chiang was actually inviting
Mao to invade Taiwan. “The Communists would be
criminally crazy,” he advised the senators,
“if they did not put an end to [Chiang’s island
bastion]
just as soon as possible.”53 Had this
happened, Acheson believed that he could have
overcome
opposition to recognizing CommunistChina.
Crowley, page 136
America would continue its
dominant role in containing the Soviet Union,
but at a lower level of effort and with
a diminished prospect of armed intervention and
greater material assistance from allies.
dominant role in containing the Soviet Union,
but at a lower level of effort and with
a diminished prospect of armed intervention and
greater material assistance from allies.
The Nixon Doctrine envisions the maintenance of
America's
dominant role in containing the USSR,
but at a lower level of effort, of
a diminished prospect of armed intervention, and
with
greater material assistance from Allies.
America's
dominant role in containing the USSR,
but at a lower level of effort, of
a diminished prospect of armed intervention, and
with
greater material assistance from Allies.
Crowley, page 137
Andrianopoulos, 1988
The objective was to reduce America’s burden of
involvement without undermining its global
commitments and influence or the confidence of its
allies, which in turndepended on
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
involvement without undermining its global
commitments and influence or the confidence of its
allies, which in turndepended on
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
The Administration's ability to reduce
America's burden of involvement without
undermining its global commitments and influence
or the confidence of its Allies critically depends upon
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
America's burden of involvement without
undermining its global commitments and influence
or the confidence of its Allies critically depends upon
reducing the level of international tensions and
the expectation of war with adversaries.
Crowley, page 304
A crucial part of the U.S.-China-Vietnam equation
was the understanding reached on Taiwan. In the
Shanghai Communique,
the United States made no specific public
concessions on when orif it would terminate
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
but it did “acknowledge” Beijing’s position that
there is “but one China” and that “Taiwan is part
of China.” Further, the United States
reaffirmed the promises it had initially
made in 1970 that, as “tensions in the area”
diminish, Washington would “progressively reduce
its forces and military installations in Taiwan.”
In addition,
the United Statesasserted
its interest in a “peaceful settlement” of the
Taiwan issue, but thecommunique did not
indicate
the specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had offered
the Chinese in order tofirm up
the new relationship. Nixon also assured the
Chinese
that he would “actively work toward” and complete
“full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by
1976,” the year that would end his second term in
office. He indicated that he would not
support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any kind ofTaiwanese
independence movement, and he
agreed to “discourage Japan or any other third
country
from moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence
diminished.”
was the understanding reached on Taiwan. In the
Shanghai Communique,
the United States made no specific public
concessions on when orif it would terminate
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
but it did “acknowledge” Beijing’s position that
there is “but one China” and that “Taiwan is part
of China.” Further, the United States
reaffirmed the promises it had initially
made in 1970 that, as “tensions in the area”
diminish, Washington would “progressively reduce
its forces and military installations in Taiwan.”
In addition,
the United Statesasserted
its interest in a “peaceful settlement” of the
Taiwan issue, but thecommunique did not
indicate
the specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had offered
the Chinese in order tofirm up
the new relationship. Nixon also assured the
Chinese
that he would “actively work toward” and complete
“full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by
1976,” the year that would end his second term in
office. He indicated that he would not
support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any kind ofTaiwanese
independence movement, and he
agreed to “discourage Japan or any other third
country
from moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence
diminished.”
The United States made no specific public
concessions on when orwhether it would break
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
but it did "acknowledge" Beijing's position that
there is "but one China" and that "Taiwan is part
of China." In addition, Washington
reaffirmed the promises it had first
made in 1970 that, as "tensions in the area"
diminish, Washington would "progressively reduce
its forces and military installations in Taiwan."
The United States also stated
its interest in a "peaceful settlement" of the
Taiwan problem, but theCommuniqué did not
mention
the specific concessions on Taiwan that Nixon had proffered
the Chinese in order tocement
the new relationship.Most significant,
especially because of it implications for the
Ford administration, wasNixon's assurance
that he would "actively work toward" and complete
"full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations by 1976,
the year that would end his second term in office. Besides promising not to
support any Taiwanese military action against the
mainland or any Taiwan
independence movement--apparently a source of
particular concern to Beijing--Nixon also
agreed to "discourage Japan or any other third
countries
from moving into Taiwan as the U.S. presence
diminished.
Crowley, page 305
"The Kissinger Transcripts," 1998
The understandingreached between the U.S. and
the PRC
on Taiwan was connected
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. American
force reductions fromthe ROC
were dependent on thegeneral reduction
of tensions in Asia. Theimplicit agreement
was that
China would
have to help to reduce
those tensions bygetting the North Vietnamese to work with Washington to end the war. During
the months after Nixon’s1972
visit, Kissingercontinually briefed Chinese
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and asked
them explicitly
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese expressed
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissinger
described
the remarks as
“moderate,” far less hostile than they could
have been. Even
when the peace talkscollapsed after
Kissinger’s famous “peace is at hand”remark,
and
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from a continuation of
the war, they listened
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks to the North Vietnamese. And even though Beijing condemned
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
moderating role until the
peace agreement was signed.
the PRC
on Taiwan was connected
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. American
force reductions fromthe ROC
were dependent on thegeneral reduction
of tensions in Asia. Theimplicit agreement
was that
China would
have to help to reduce
those tensions bygetting the North Vietnamese to work with Washington to end the war. During
the months after Nixon’s1972
visit, Kissingercontinually briefed Chinese
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and asked
them explicitly
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese expressed
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissinger
described
the remarks as
“moderate,” far less hostile than they could
have been. Even
when the peace talkscollapsed after
Kissinger’s famous “peace is at hand”remark,
and
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from a continuation of
the war, they listened
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing attacks to the North Vietnamese. And even though Beijing condemned
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
moderating role until the
peace agreement was signed.
The understanding
on Taiwan was linked
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. U.S.
force reductions fromTaiwan
were dependent on thelessening
of tensions in the area.Implicitly,
China would also
have to help lessen
those tensions byencouraging North Vietnam
to settle at the conference table. While China's
(or for that matter theSoviet Union's) impact
on the negotiations remains to be learned, in
the months after Nixon's
visit, Kissinger was assiduous in briefing PRC
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and in asking them
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese would
express
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissingerfound
the remarks
"moderate."
When the peace talksbroke down in the wake of
Kissinger's famous "peace is at hand"statement,
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from extended conflict.
Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua admonished that
"one should not lose thewhole world just to
gain South Vietnam." Nevertheless, the Chinese
kept listening
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing
attacks. While Beijingwould strongly condemn
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
role as intermediaryuntil the signing of the
Paris
peace agreement.
on Taiwan was linked
with a less explicit one on Vietnam. U.S.
force reductions fromTaiwan
were dependent on thelessening
of tensions in the area.Implicitly,
China would also
have to help lessen
those tensions byencouraging North Vietnam
to settle at the conference table. While China's
(or for that matter theSoviet Union's) impact
on the negotiations remains to be learned, in
the months after Nixon's
visit, Kissinger was assiduous in briefing PRC
diplomats on the Paris peace talks and in asking them
to intervene with Hanoi. The Chinese would
express
criticism of U.S. bombings, but Kissingerfound
the remarks
"moderate."
When the peace talksbroke down in the wake of
Kissinger's famous "peace is at hand"statement,
the Chinese criticized him and argued that only
the Soviets could benefit from extended conflict.
Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua admonished that
"one should not lose thewhole world just to
gain South Vietnam." Nevertheless, the Chinese
kept listening
to Kissinger and presumably delivered his
December 1972 warnings of possible bombing
attacks. While Beijingwould strongly condemn
the Christmas bombings, it continued to play a
role as intermediaryuntil the signing of the
Paris
peace agreement.
Source: http://money.cnn.com/interactive/news/kfile-monica-crowley-dissertation-plagiarism/index.html
